Two common criticisms of Nash equilibrium are its dependence on very demanding epistemic assumptions and its computational intractability. We study the computational properties of less demanding set-valued solution concepts that are based on varying notions of dominance. These concepts are intuitively appealing, always exist, and admit unique minimal solutions in important subclasses of games. Examples include Shapley's saddles, Harsanyi and Selten's primitive formations, Basu and Weibull's CURB sets, and Dutta and Laslier's minimal covering set. Based on a unifying framework proposed by Duggan and Le Breton, we formulate two generic algorithms for computing these concepts and investigate for which classes of games and which properties of the underlying dominance notion the algorithms are sound and efficient. We identify two sets of conditions that are sufficient for polynomial-time computability and show that the conditions are satisfied, for instance, by saddles and primitive formations in normal-form games, minimal CURB sets in two-player games, and the minimal covering set in symmetric matrix games. Our positive algorithmic results explain regularities observed in the literature, but also apply to several solution concepts whose computational complexity was previously unknown. 
INTRODUCTION
Saddle points, that is, combinations of actions such that no player can gain by deviating, are among the earliest solution concepts considered in game theory (see, e.g., von Neumann and Morgenstern [1944] ). In two-player zero-sum games (henceforth matrix games), every saddle point happens to coincide with the optimal outcome both players can guarantee in the worst case and thus enjoys a very strong normative foundation. Unfortunately, however, not every matrix game possesses a saddle point. In order to remedy this situation, Borel [1921] introduced mixed-that is, randomized-strategies and von Neumann [1928] proved that every matrix game contains a mixed saddle point (or equilibrium) that moreover maintains the appealing normative properties of saddle Authors' addresses: F. Brandt, Institut für Informatik, TU München, Boltzmannstr. 3, 85748 Garching bei München, Germany; email: brandtf@in.tum.de; M. Brill, Department of Computer Science, University of Oxford, Wolfson Building, Parks Road, Oxford OX1 3QD, UK; email: markus.brill@cs.ox.ac.uk. Permission to make digital or hard copies of part or all of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies show this notice on the first page or initial screen of a display along with the full citation. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on servers, to redistribute to lists, or to use any component of this work in other works requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Permissions may be requested frompoints. The existence result was later generalized to arbitrary normal-form games by Nash [1951] , at the expense of its normative foundation. Since then, Nash equilibrium has commonly been criticized for resting on very demanding epistemic assumptions. 1 Shapley [1953a Shapley [ , 1953b showed that the existence of saddle points (and even uniqueness in the case of matrix games) can also be guaranteed by moving to minimal sets of actions rather than randomizations over them. 2 Shapley defines a generalized saddle point (GSP) to be a pair of subsets of actions for each player that satisfies a simple external stability condition: every action not contained in a player's subset is dominated by some action in the set, given that the other player chooses actions from his or her set. A GSP is minimal if it does not contain another GSP. Minimal GSPs, which Shapley calls saddles, also satisfy internal stability in the sense that no two actions within a set dominate each other, given that the other player chooses actions from his or her set. While Shapley was the first to conceive GSPs, he was not the only one. Apparently unaware of Shapley's work, Samuelson [1992] uses the very related concept of a consistent pair to point out epistemic inconsistencies in the concept of iterated weak dominance. Also, weakly admissible sets as defined by McKelvey and Ordeshook [1976] in the context of spatial voting games and the minimal covering set as defined by Dutta [1988] in the context of majority tournaments are GSPs [Duggan and Le Breton 1996] . In a regrettably unpublished paper, Duggan and Le Breton [2014] 3 extend Shapley's approach to normal-form games and define a D-solution as a tuple of sets that is internally and externally stable with respect to a so-called dominance structure D. Depending on D, a number of different solution concepts can be defined. The framework is rich enough to cover not only Shapley's saddles but also other common set-valued solution concepts such as rationalizability [Bernheim 1984; Pearce 1984] and CURB sets [Basu and Weibull 1991] ; see Section 3.2 for details.
We are mainly interested in D-cores, which are (inclusion-)minimal D-solutions. For the case of strict dominance (S), Shapley [1964] showed that every matrix game admits a unique S-core. Duggan and Le Breton [2014] extend this uniqueness result to other dominance structures and to a larger class of games by showing, among other things, that equilibrium safe games (a class of n-player games that includes matrix games) have a unique core with respect to strict dominance, mixed strict dominance (S * ), and Börgers dominance (B) [Börgers 1993 ]. Furthermore, Duggan and Le Breton [1996] proved uniqueness of the core with respect to weak dominance (W) and very weak dominance (V ) in a subclass of symmetric matrix games that we refer to as confrontation games. While it is easy to see that a matrix game can have multiple V -cores, Brandt et al. [2016] showed that V -cores in matrix games are-just like pure and mixed saddle points-interchangeable and equivalent.
In recent years, the computational complexity of game-theoretic solution concepts has come under increasing scrutiny. One of the most prominent results in this stream of research is that the problem of finding Nash equilibria in bimatrix games is PPADcomplete [Chen et al. 2009; Daskalakis et al. 2009 ] and thus unlikely to admit an efficient algorithm. This result has sparked the search for alternative, computationally tractable, solution concepts. Despite the fact that Shapley's saddles were devised as early as 1953 [Shapley 1953a [Shapley , 1953b and are thus almost as old as Nash equilibrium [Nash 1951 ], surprisingly little is known about their computational properties.
1 See, e.g., Luce and Raiffa [1957, pp. 74-76] , Fishburn [1978] , Bernheim [1984] , Pearce [1984] , Myerson [1991, pp. 88-91] , Börgers [1993] , Aumann and Brandenburger [1995] , Perea [2007] , Jungbauer and Ritzberger [2011] , Barelli [2009] , and Bach and Tsakas [2014] . 2 The main results of the 1953 reports later reappeared in revised form [Shapley 1964] . 3 An earlier version of the paper by Duggan and Le Breton has been circulating since 1996 under the title "Dominance-Based Solutions for Strategic Form Games."
Table I. Summary of Results
For a given dominance structure D and a class of games (ordered by set inclusion), the table shows bounds on the asymptotic number of D-cores (unique, polynomial, or exponential) . If a cell is highlighted in dark gray, the greedy algorithm finds all D-cores in the given class in polynomial time. If it is highlighted in light gray, the analogous statement holds for the sophisticated algorithm. If a cell spans several columns, the corresponding D-cores coincide within the respective class of games. Covering (C M ) and deep covering (C D ) are only defined for symmetric matrix games.
Common notions of dominance have widely been studied from a computational perspective in the form of iterated dominance [Knuth et al. 1988; Gilboa et al. 1993; Conitzer and Sandholm 2005; Brandt et al. 2011a] . D-cores are "refinements" of iterated Ddominance and cannot be found by iterated elimination of dominated actions.
In this article, we propose two generic algorithms (a greedy and a sophisticated one) for computing D-cores and study their soundness and efficiency for various dominance structures D and subclasses of games. In addition to the dominance structures mentioned earlier, we study their mixed counterparts (denoted by D * for a given dominance structure D) [Duggan and Le Breton 2014] , covering (C M ) [McKelvey 1986; Dutta and Laslier 1999] , and deep covering (C D ) [Duggan 2013 ]. We then define abstract properties that, when satisfied by a dominance structure within a particular class of games, allow for our algorithms to be sound and efficient. Our results yield -greedy algorithms for computing all S-cores (aka saddles), S * -cores (aka primitive formations or mixed saddles and equivalent to CURB sets in two-player games), and B-cores of a given normal-form game, and -sophisticated algorithms for computing the unique C M -core and the unique C D -core of a given symmetric matrix game. Within the subclass of confrontation games, these algorithms coincide and also yield the W-core and the V -core (aka weak saddle).
Our algorithms subsume existing algorithms for computing saddles in matrix games [Shapley 1964 ], the (unique) minimal covering set in symmetric win-lose-tie games [Brandt and Fischer 2008] , and minimal CURB sets in two-player games [Benisch et al. 2010] . Interestingly, the sophisticated algorithms rely on the repeated computation of Nash equilibria via linear programming, even though most of the corresponding solution concepts are purely ordinal. For the remaining combinations of dominance structures and classes of games, we show that these classes admit an exponential number of D-cores. This renders the computation of all D-cores infeasible. 4 Our results are summarized in Table I . 
PRELIMINARIES
A (finite) game in normal form is a tuple = (N, (A i ) i∈N , (u i ) i∈N ), where N = {1, . . . , n} is a nonempty finite set of players, A i is a nonempty finite set of actions available to player i ∈ N, and u i : ( i∈N A i ) → R is a function mapping each action profile (i.e., combination of actions) to a real-valued utility for player i.
A two-player game = ({1, 2}, (A 1 , A 2 ), (u 1 , u 2 )) is a matrix game (or zero-sum game) if u 1 (a 1 , a 2 ) + u 2 (a 1 , a 2 ) = 0 for all (a 1 , a 2 ) ∈ A 1 × A 2 . It is symmetric if A 1 = A 2 and u 1 (a 1 , a 2 ) = u 2 (a 2 , a 1 ) for all (a 1 , a 2 ) ∈ A 1 × A 1 . Whenever we are concerned with symmetric matrix games, we slightly deviate from the notation used in the rest of the article for notational convenience: the set A 1 = A 2 of actions is denoted by A, the utility function of player 1 is denoted by u, and the game itself is denoted by (A, u) . A symmetric matrix game can be conveniently represented by a skew-symmetric matrix containing the utilities of player 1. For a subset B ⊆ A of actions, | B denotes the subgame of = (A, u) restricted to B; that is, | B is the symmetric matrix game (B, u| B×B ). Confrontation games are symmetric matrix games characterized by the fact that the two players receive the same utility if and only if they play the same action [Duggan and Le Breton 1996] . Formally, a symmetric matrix game = (A, u) is a confrontation game if for all a, b ∈ A, u(a, b) = 0 if and only if a = b.
5 A win-lose-tie game is a matrix game in which all payoffs are either −1, 0, or 1. A confrontation game that is also a win-lose-tie game is called a tournament game.
6 Tournament games generalize the well-known game of rock-paper-scissors and are surprisingly rich (see, e.g., Fisher and Ryan [1992] , Laffond et al. [1993] , Fisher and Ryan [1995] , and Fisher and Reeves [1995] ). Many interesting game-theoretic phenomena already appear in tournament games. In fact, finding Nash equilibria in tournament games may be as hard as finding Nash equilibria in general zero-sum games. Let (M) denote the set of all probability distributions over a finite set M. A (mixed) strategy of a player i ∈ N is an element of (A i ). Utility functions are extended to profiles of strategies in the usual way. A Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile such that no player can benefit by unilaterally deviating from his or her strategy. The essential set ES( ) is the set of all actions that are played with positive probability in some Nash equilibrium of [Dutta and Laslier 1999] . As every normal-form game contains a Nash equilibrium [Nash 1951] , the essential set is never empty.
DOMINANCE-BASED SOLUTION CONCEPTS
In this section, we formally define the dominance structures and solution concepts considered in this article. Furthermore, we introduce a number of properties that will be critical for our algorithmic results.
Dominance Structures
The following notation will be used throughout the article. Let A N denote the ntuple (A 1 , . . . , A n ) containing all action sets. An n-tuple X = (X 1 , . . . , X n ) is said to be nonempty, denoted X = ∅, if X i = ∅ for all i ∈ N. For a nonempty n-tuple X = (X 1 , . . . , X n ), we write X ⊆ A N if X i ⊆ A i for all i ∈ N. To simplify the exposition, we will frequently abuse terminology and refer to an n-tuple X ⊆ A N as a "set."
5 Duggan and Le Breton [1996] refer to this property as the off-diagonal property. 6 The term tournament game refers to the fact that such a game = (A, u) can be represented by a tournament graph with vertex set A and edge set {(a, b) : u(a, b) = 1}. In a similar fashion, a confrontation game can be represented by a weighted tournament graph. 7 Brandt and Fischer [2008] pointed out that computing Nash equilibria in symmetric win-lose-tie gameswhich are slightly more general than tournament games-is P-complete (under log-space reductions) and therefore at least as hard as any problem in P.
For every player i, we furthermore let X −i denote the set j∈N\{i} X j of all opponent action profiles in which each opponent j ∈ N\{i} plays an action from X j ⊆ A j .
Consider a player i ∈ N. Whether an action (or a set of actions) in A i dominates another action a i ∈ A i naturally depends on which actions the other players have at their disposal. This is reflected in the following definition, in which a dominance structure D is defined as a mapping from sets X −i of opponent action profiles to dominance relations D(X −i ) for player i. A dominance relation for a player relates subsets of actions of this player to individual actions of the same player, that is,
is "preferable" to action a i given X −i . We require that if X i is preferable to a i , then so is every superset of X i .
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Definition 3.1. Let = (N, (A i ) i∈N , (u i ) i∈N ) be a game in normal form and X ⊆ A N . For each player i ∈ N, a dominance structure D maps X −i to a subset of 2
. In this case, we say that X i D-dominates a i with respect to X −i . If X i consists of a single action x i , we write
We go on to define the main dominance structures considered by Duggan and Le Breton [2001, 2014] .
for all x −i ∈ X −i and the inequality is strict for at least one
and the inequality is strict for at least one
Börgers dominance has a mixed counterpart as well, requiring that
However, mixed Börgers dominance coincides with mixed strict dominance [Duggan and Le Breton 2014] .
The following dominance structures are only defined for symmetric matrix games; we sometimes refer to them as symmetric dominance structures. Definition 3.3. Let (A, u) be a symmetric matrix game, X, Y ⊆ A, and a ∈ A.
Covering was introduced by McKelvey [1986] and later generalized by Dutta and Laslier [1999] , and deep covering is a generalization of a notion by Duggan [2013] . Covering and deep covering are equivalent in confrontation games.
For two dominance structures D and D , we write D ⊆ D and say that D is coarser
The following relations follow immediately from the respective definitions:
D-Solutions and D-Cores
Generalizing a classic cooperative solution concept by von Neumann and Morgenstern [1944] , a set of actions X can be said to be stable if it consists precisely of those alternatives not dominated by X (see also Wilson [1970] ). This fixed-point characterization can be split into two conditions of internal and external stability: first, there should be no reason to restrict the selection by excluding some action from it; second, there should be an argument against each proposal to include an outside action in the selection.
Definition 3.4. Let D be a dominance structure and
(1)
We refer to (1) and (2) Various set-valued solution concepts that have been proposed in the literature can be characterized as D-cores for some dominance structure D. An action profile (a 1 , . . . , a n ) ∈ i∈N A i is a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies if and only if ({a 1 }, . . . , {a n }) is a V -core. Shapley's [1964] saddles and weak saddles for matrix games correspond to S-and V -cores, respectively; Dutta and Laslier's [1999] minimal covering set for symmetric matrix games corresponds to the C M -core; and Duggan's [2013] deep covering set for symmetric win-lose-tie games corresponds to the C D -core. Furthermore, mixed refinements of Shapley's saddles, as proposed by Duggan and Le Breton [2001] for symmetric win-lose-tie games, correspond to S * -and W * -cores. Two further solution concepts that fit into this framework are Harsanyi and Selten's [1988] formations and Basu and Weibull's [1991] CURB sets. The respective dominance structures are defined in terms of best-response sets. An action a i is rationally dominated with respect to a set X −i of opponent action profiles if it is not a best response to any mixed opponent strategy with support in X −i . A subtle difference occurs if there are more than two players (and therefore more than one opponent). While in correlated rational dominance (R c ), opponents are allowed to play joint, that is, correlated, mixtures (and thus to act like a single opponent), uncorrelated rational dominance (R u ) restricts opponents to independent mixtures. A tuple of sets is a CURB set if and only if it is externally stable with respect to R u , and minimal CURB sets coincide with R u -cores. Similarly, a tuple of sets is a formation if and only if it is externally stable with respect to R c , and primitive formations are R c -cores. Since it is well known that an action is not a best response to some correlated opponent strategy if and only if it is strictly dominated by a mixed strategy (see, e.g., Pearce [1984, Lemma 3] ), the dominance structures R c and S * coincide. As a consequence, all our results concerning S * -cores directly apply to primitive formations as well. The same is true for minimal CURB sets in two-player games, due to the equivalence of R c and R u for n = 2. 
Properties of Dominance Structures
We now define a number of properties in order to formalize for which dominance structures D-cores can be computed efficiently. An action a i ∈ A i is said to be D-maximal with respect to
Definition 3.6. Let D be a dominance structure and X ⊆ A N . The set of D-maximal elements of A i with respect to X −i is defined as It is easily seen that S, B, and V are monotonic, and that W is not. S and W satisfy maximal domination because the relations S(X −i ) and W(X −i )-restricted to pairs of singletons-are transitive and irreflexive. On the other hand, V violates MAX because max(V (X −i )) may be empty. It directly follows from the definitions that S, W, V , C M , and C D are singular.
Computational tractability of dominance structures is a mild requirement. Indeed, if a dominance structure does not satisfy COM, there is no hope for computing Dsolutions efficiently. As shown in Sections 5 and 6, all the dominance structures defined in Section 3.1 satisfy COM.
The following properties of dominance structures are defined in the context of symmetric matrix games.
-computational tractability of finding subsets (SUB-COM) if a nonempty subset of a D-core can be computed in polynomial time, and -uniqueness in symmetric matrix games (UNI) if every symmetric matrix game has a unique D-core.
In contrast to COM, property SUB-COM is rather demanding. However, there is a useful sufficient condition involving the essential set. Since the essential set of a game can be computed efficiently via linear programming, a dominance structure D satisfies SUB-COM if every D-core of a game contains the essential set ES( ).
Monotonicity turns out to be sufficient for the existence of solutions: if a dominance structure D satisfies MON, a D-solution can be constructed by iteratively eliminating actions that are D-dominated [Duggan and Le Breton 2014] . Once the elimination process terminates, MON ensures that the resulting set is externally D-stable. Note, however, that these solutions need not be minimal (see, e.g., Figure 1) . 12 In symmetric matrix games, the same is true for dominance structures satisfying weak monotonicity. As weak dominance and mixed weak dominance are not monotonic, the previous argument does not apply to those dominance structures. In fact, there are games without any W-or W * -solution (see Figure 2 for an example). For this reason, we do not consider W-and W * -solutions in this article. [Duggan and Le Breton 2014] . The maximal S * -solution of a two-player game, for instance, consists of all rationalizable actions [Pearce 1984; Bernheim 1984] . 13 The fact that W -solutions may fail to exist was first observed by Samuelson [1992] . There are at least three approaches to restore the existence of W -solutions. First, one can ignore internal stability and define Wsolutions as externally W -stable sets [Duggan and Le Breton 2001] . The properties of W -cores defined in this way are similar to those of V -cores: the number of W -cores may be exponential, even in symmetric matrix Monotonicity of a dominance structure is also an important ingredient in several results on the uniqueness of (minimal or maximal) D-solutions [Duggan and Le Breton 2014] . However, those uniqueness results do not apply to the dominance structures C M and C D (which only satisfy weak monotonicity). Results on the uniqueness of D-cores with respect to these dominance structures are given in Section 6.
Another beneficial property of (weakly) monotonic dominance structures is that minimal externally stable sets also happen to be internally stable. This is again due to the fact that the iterative elimination of dominated actions preserves external stability. PROPOSITION 3.9. The first part of Proposition 3.9 follows from Proposition 2 of Duggan and Le Breton [2014] .
14 The proof of the second part is completely analogous. Our proofs will frequently exploit the equivalence of D-cores and minimal externally D-stable sets. In particular, we will make use of the following easy corollary of Proposition 3.9. COROLLARY 3.10. 
GENERAL RESULTS
We will now study how to compute minimal solutions for the dominance structures introduced in the previous section. To this end, we introduce two generic algorithms: a greedy and a sophisticated one. In principle, these algorithms can be applied to any game and any of the dominance structures introduced in Section 3.1. The goal of this section is to identify, for each algorithm, which properties of a dominance structure guarantee that the algorithm is sound and efficient. In addition, we will construct families of games that admit an exponential number of minimal solutions.
Generic Greedy Algorithm
Shapley [1964] has shown that every matrix game possesses a unique S-core and described an algorithm, attributed to Harlan Mills, to compute this set. The idea behind this algorithm is that given a nonempty subset of the S-core, the S-core itself games, and a number of natural problems concerning W -cores are computationally intractable [Brandt et al. 2011b] . Second, one can look for restricted classes of games in which W -solutions are guaranteed to exist. One such class is the class of confrontation games, where the W -core is unique and coincides with the V -core. 
One particularly useful consequence of Proposition 4.1 is the uniqueness of minimal externally D-stable sets containing given sets of actions. (a 1 , . . . , a n ) ∈ i∈N A i do add min ext( , ({a 1 }, . . . , {a n })) to set C end for return {X ∈ C : there does not exist X ∈ C with X = X and X ⊆ X} PROOF. We show that Algorithm 1 computes the minimal externally D-stable set containing X 0 and runs in polynomial time. Algorithm 1 starts with X 0 and iteratively adds all actions that are maximal with respect to the current set X −i of opponent action profiles. As D satisfies COM, these actions can be computed efficiently. Moreover, the number of loops is bounded by n i=1 |A i |. Let X min be the minimal externally D-stable set containing X 0 . We show that during the execution of Algorithm 1, the set X is always a subset of X min . At the end of the algorithm,
We prove X ⊆ X min by induction on |X| = PROOF. Let = (N, (A i ) i∈N , (u i ) i∈N ) be a game in normal form. We show that Algorithm 2 computes all D-cores of and runs in polynomial time. Polynomial running time follows immediately because Algorithm 1 is invoked i∈N |A i | times, and inclusion minimality can be checked easily.
As for correctness, we first note that every D-core X is an element of the set C. To see this, note that Proposition 4.1 implies that X is the minimal externally D-stable set containing ({x 1 }, . . . , {x n }), for every (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ n i=1 X i . To show that all inclusionminimal elements of C are D-cores, observe that all elements of C are externally D-stable. Thus, the first part of Corollary 3.10 implies that every element of C contains a D-core. Since all D-cores are elements of C, the inclusion-minimal elements of C are exactly the D-cores of .
Generic Sophisticated Algorithm for symmetric matrix Games
Algorithm 2 is not sound for all dominance structures considered in this article. For instance, very weak dominance violates maximal domination and therefore does not satisfy the conditions of Theorem 4.4. The example given in Figure 3 shows that, even in tournament games, where V -cores are generally unique, Algorithm 2 fails to find the V -core. The failure of the greedy algorithm can be traced back to the following a 2 , a 3 }, {a 1 , a 2 , a 3 }) . A naive adaptation of Algorithm 2-starting with a pair ({a i }, {a j }) and iteratively adding all actions that are not V -dominated-results in proper supersets of the V -core.
problem: since the set of D-maximal actions with respect to a given set X −i may be empty, it is no longer obvious which actions should be added to a strict subset of a D-core. In particular, adding all actions that are not D-dominated with respect to the current subset does not work (see Figure 3 ). We will identify conditions on dominance structures D that allow for the following sophisticated method: instead of adding all Dundominated actions, merely add actions contained in a D-core of the subgame induced by the D-undominated actions. This immediately gives rise to a recursive algorithm, whose running time may, however, be exponential. Whenever a nonempty subset of a D-core can be found efficiently, which fortunately is the case for many symmetric dominance structures we consider, an efficient algorithm can be constructed.
In this section, we will only be concerned with symmetric matrix games and dominance structures D satisfying uniqueness in symmetric matrix games (UNI). If a symmetric matrix game has a unique D-core (X 1 , X 2 ), it is easily verified that X 1 = X 2 . 16 In this case, the set X 1 = X 2 will be denoted by S D ( ). The following lemma is the key ingredient for the sophisticated algorithm. Given a game and a subset X of the D-core of , it identifies sufficient conditions for the D-core of | A to be contained in the D-core of , where | A is the subgame of that is induced by the D-undominated actions with respect to X.
LEMMA 4.5. Let be a symmetric matrix game and D a dominance structure satisfying weak MON, TRA, SING, and UNI. Let furthermore X ⊆ S D ( ) and let A denote the set of actions that are neither contained in X nor D-dominated with respect to X, that is,
PROOF. Let X ⊆ S D ( ) and A = {a ∈ A\X : ¬(X D(X) a)}. We can assume that A is nonempty, as otherwise S D ( | A ) is empty and there is nothing to prove. Now partition the set A into two sets C = A ∩ S D ( ) and C = A \S D ( ) of actions contained in S D ( ) and actions not contained in S D ( ). We will show that (C, C) is externally D-stable in | A . Then, the second part of Corollary 3.10 and UNI imply that
In order to show that (C, C) is externally D-stable in | A , consider some z ∈ C . Since z / ∈ S D ( ), SING implies that there exists y ∈ S D ( ) with y D(S D ( )) z. We show that y ∈ C. It is easy to see that y / ∈ X, since otherwise weak MON would imply that y D(X) z, contradicting the assumption that z ∈ A . On the other hand, assume that Two further properties are required to turn the insight of Lemma 4.5 into an efficient algorithm: first, we need a polynomial-time algorithm to compute a nonempty subset of the unique D-core; second, the dominance structure D itself must be computationally tractable.
THEOREM 4.6. If D satisfies weak MON, TRA, SING, UNI, SUB-COM, and COM, the D-core of a symmetric matrix game can be computed in polynomial time.

PROOF. Let
= (A, u) be a symmetric matrix game. We show that Algorithm 3 computes S D ( ) and runs in polynomial time. In each iteration, at least one action is added to the set X, so the algorithm is guaranteed to terminate after at most |A| iterations. Each iteration consists of (1) computing the set A of D-undominated actions and (2) finding a subset X of S D ( | A ). Since D satisfies COM and SUB-COM, both tasks can be performed in polynomial time.
As for correctness, we show by induction on the number of iterations that X ⊆ S D ( ) holds at any time. When the algorithm terminates, X is externally D-stable, which together with the induction hypothesis implies that X = S D ( ). The base case is trivial. Now assume that X ⊆ S D ( ) at the beginning of a particular iteration.
where the first inclusion is due to X ⊆ S D ( | A ) and the second inclusion follows from Lemma 4.5 and the induction hypothesis.
Games with an Exponential Number of D-Cores
Our algorithms do not apply to all dominance structures considered in this article. In fact, some dominance structures give rise to an exponential number of D-cores, even in symmetric matrix games. We need the following lemma, which is easily established. LEMMA 4.7. Let = (A, u) be a symmetric matrix game. Define as the matrix game that is identical to except that player 1 has an additional actionâ that always yields a utility of 1. That is, = ({1, 2}, (A ∪ {â}, A), (u 1 , u 2 )) with u 1 (a, b) = u(a, b) for all a, b ∈ A, u 1 (â, a) = 1 for all a ∈ A, and u 2 = −u 1 . Then, there exists no subset X ⊆ A such that X V * (X)â.
PROOF. Assume for contradiction that X V * (X)â for some X ⊆ A and let s ∈ (X) be a strategy that strictly dominatesâ with respect to X. Consider the matrix game | X . In this game, playing strategy s guarantees a payoff of at least 1. However, the game | X is symmetric and thus has a value of zero, meaning that no player can guarantee a strictly positive payoff. 
PROOF. Let D ∈ {V, V * } and consider a symmetric matrix game = (A, u). We now construct the family
) is defined inductively as follows:
where for each ∈ {0, 1, 2}, A k, is a copy of A k . For a ∈ A k, and b ∈ A k, , the utility function u k+1 is defined by
where + r should be understood to mean + r mod 3. If M k is the matrix representing k , 1 is the |A k | × |A k | matrix containing only ones, and −1 is (−1) · 1, then the game k+1 is represented by the block matrix
Property (ii) follows immediately from the construction. For (i), we will show that, for each k ≥ 1, the symmetric D-cores of k+1 can be characterized in terms of the symmetric D-cores of k . The following notation will be useful. For X ⊆ A k+1 and ∈ {0, 1, 2}, let X = X ∩ A k, denote the part of X that lies in block . We claim that for each k ≥ 1,
Before proving this equivalence, we make the following observation:
To see this, let x ∈ X be an arbitrary action in X and choose such that x ∈ X . Consider the game where the actions of player 2 are restricted to X . As u k+1 (a, b) = 1 for all a ∈ X +1 and b ∈ X , Lemma 4.7 implies that no action in X +1 is D-dominated by X . Therefore, at least one of the actions in X +1 has to be contained in X, that is, X +1 = ∅. Repeating the argument, X +1 = ∅ implies X +2 = ∅, which proves (4).
We are now ready to prove (3). For the direction from left to right, assume that (X, X) is a D-core in k+1 and let ∈ {0, 1, 2}. We need to show that (X , X ) is a D-core in k . By (4), we know that
However, the definition of u k+1 ensures that none of the actions in X +1 ∪ X +2 is involved in the domination of a, and that actually X D(X) a. The monotonicity of D finally yields X D(X ) a. For minimality of (X , X ), note that the existence of an externally D-stable set (X , Y ) = (X , X ) in k with X , Y ⊆ X would contradict the minimality of (X, X) in k+1 .
For the direction from right to left, (X, X) is externally D-stable in k+1 because each (X , X ) is externally D-stable in k . Furthermore (X, X) is minimal, as a proper subset of (X, X) that is externally D-stable in k+1 would yield an externally D-stable subset of (X , X ) for some ∈ {0, 1, 2}, contradicting the minimality of (X , X ) in k . We have thus proven (3).
Finally
The construction used in the proof of Theorem 4.8 also works for weak dominance and mixed weak dominance.
GREEDY ALGORITHMS
In this section, we investigate the consequences of Theorem 4.4 on S-, B-, and S * -cores. PROOF. According to Theorem 4.4, it suffices to show that B satisfies MON, MAX, and COM. As was the case for S, it can easily be checked that B satisfies MON and MAX.
It remains to be shown that B satisfies COM. Consider the following procedure, formalized in Algorithm 4, which checks whether X i B(X −i ) a i holds. First, check whether X i weakly dominates a i . If no, then X i does not B-dominate a i either. If yes, we can find an action
as the set of all tuples x −i ∈ X −i for which the latter inequality is strict. C(x i ) is nonempty by definition of W. It follows that
We can therefore restrict attention to subsets of Y −i \C(x i ) and "recursively" check whether
It is easily verified that this procedure runs in polynomial time and correctly checks Börgers dominance. For the former, observe that the number of loops is bounded by |X −i |. 
The requirements for the greedy algorithm are also met by mixed strict dominance. We now show that S * satisfies MAX. 17 We use the following notation. For a strategy s ∈ (A i ) and an action a ∈ A i , we write s > X −i a if s strictly dominates a with respect to X −i , that is, if u(s, x −i ) > u(a, x −i ) for all x −i ∈ X −i . We simply write s > a if X −i is clear from the context. We call an action dominated if there exists a strategy s ∈ (A i ) with s > a.
Consider a strategy s ∈ (A i ) and an action a ∈ A i . For a strategy t ∈ (A i ) with t(a) < 1, we denote by s a→t the strategy in which action a gets probability zero and the probability mass from action a is redistributed among other alternatives according to t. . It is easily verified that s > a. But s (b) = 0, contradicting the assumption that b is necessary for the domination of a.
We are now ready to prove that S * satisfies MAX. Consider a game , a player i ∈ N, and a set X −i of opponent action profiles. Let M = max(S * (X −i )) and L = A i \M denote the maximal and dominated actions of player i, respectively. We need to show that M S * (X −i ) a for all a ∈ L. Our proof is by induction on the number k = |L| of dominated strategies.
If k = 0, there is nothing to show, and for k = 1 the statement follows from observation (i). Now assume k ≥ 2 and consider two dominated actions a, b ∈ L. By observation (ii), we know that b is not necessary for the domination of a. Thus, a is still dominated in the subgame of in which player i is restricted to action set A i \{b}. By induction, a i is dominated by the set M of maximal actions of player i in . Clearly, M is identical to the set M of maximal actions of player i in . Thus, M S * (X −i ) a. Since the argument works for every dominated action a ∈ L, we have shown that S * satisfies MAX.
SOPHISTICATED ALGORITHMS FOR SYMMETRIC MATRIX GAMES
In this section, we investigate the consequences of Theorems 4.6 and 4.8 on C D -, C M -, V -, and V * -cores. Let us first consider C M and C D , which are only defined in symmetric matrix games. For this class of games, it turns out that both dominance structures yield unique minimal solutions. In fact, we can show the following more general result. For the case D = C M , it was already known that every symmetric matrix game has a unique symmetric C M -core [Dutta and Laslier 1999, Theorem 4.2] . Furthermore, Lemmata 1 and 2 of Duggan and Le Breton [1996] imply that every confrontation game has a unique C M -core. (See Footnote 20 for details.)
It is unknown whether D ⊆ C M is necessary for the uniqueness of D-cores in symmetric matrix games. Various dominance structures that are finer than C M have been shown to admit disjoint minimal solutions, sometimes involving rather elaborate combinatorial arguments. Examples include unidirectional covering [Brandt and Fischer 2008] and extending [Brandt 2011; Brandt et al. 2013] .
In order to prove Proposition 6.1, we need the following two lemmata. Since A is finite, the sequence (a 0 , a 1 , a 2 , . . .) must contain repetitions. Without loss of generality, assume that a k = a 0 for some even k > 0. We can therefore construct the following chain of inequalities (consult Figure 4 for an example with k = 6):
It follows that all utilities in this chain of inequalities are equal. Moreover, since is a symmetric matrix game, we have that u(a 1 , a 1 ) = 0 and hence that all utilities in this chain are zero. In particular, u(a 1 , a 0 ) = 0, which contradicts the assumption that a 1 D(Y ) a 0 (because we have observed that the latter implies u(a 1 , a 0 ) > 0). This proves that X ∩ Y = ∅. It is now easy to prove Proposition 6.1.
19 X ∩ Y = ∅ also follows from Claim 2 in the the proof of Theorem 4.2 of Dutta and Laslier [1999] . We now show that the other requirements for the sophisticated algorithm are satisfied as well. PROOF. According to Theorem 4.6, it is sufficient to show that both C M and C D satisfy weak MON, TRA, SING, UNI, SUB-COM, and COM.
It is easily verified that both C M and C D satisfy weak MON, TRA, SING, and COM. UNI was shown in Corollary 6.4. Finally, Dutta and Laslier [1999] have shown that the essential set ES( ) is a (nonempty) subset of S C M ( ). Since the essential set can be computed in polynomial time using linear programming (see Brandt and Fischer [2008] ), this proves that C M satisfies SUB-COM. The same is true for C D because
S C M ( ) ⊆ S C D ( ).
Let us now turn to very weak dominance. In contrast to S-cores, V -cores are not unique in matrix games. It is in fact easily seen that even a symmetric matrix game can have multiple very weak saddles: if all action profiles yield the same utility, then every single profile constitutes a V -core. Therefore, Theorem 4.8 implies that there are symmetric matrix games with an exponential number of V -cores. The following corollary is an immediate consequence. COROLLARY 6.6. Computing all V -cores of a game requires exponential time in the worst case, even for symmetric matrix games.
We emphasize that this result does not preclude the existence of an efficient algorithm that finds a succinct representation of V -cores for a given matrix game. In fact, the recent finding that V -cores in matrix games are interchangeable and equivalent raises hope that this might indeed be possible [Brandt et al. 2016] . It is even open whether a single V -core of a matrix game can be computed efficiently. For non-zero-sum games, Brandt et al. [2011b] have shown that a number of natural problems like finding Vcores, checking whether a given action is contained in some V -core, or deciding whether there is a unique V -core are computationally intractable.
In confrontation games, the picture is different: Duggan and Le Breton [1996] have shown that these games have a unique V -core, which moreover coincides with the (unique) C M -core. 20 The following positive result now follows from Corollary 6.5.
COROLLARY 6.7. The unique V -core of a confrontation game can be computed in polynomial time. 20 To be precise, Duggan and Le Breton [1996] have shown that the W -core of a confrontation game is unique and coincides with the C M -core. However, it can be shown that the proofs carry over for very weak dominance. As a consequence, V -cores, W -cores, and C M -cores all coincide in confrontation games. a 2 , a 3 }, {a 1 , a 2 , a 3 }) and ({a 4 , a 5 , a 6 }, {a 4 , a 5 , a 6 }). In the former V * -core, a 4 is dominated by In order to guarantee the uniqueness of V * -cores, we thus have to restrict the class of games even further. Duggan and Le Breton [2001] have shown that tournament games have a unique V * -core, which moreover coincides with the (unique) C M -core.
COROLLARY 6.9. The unique V * -core of a tournament game can be computed in polynomial time.
